26 Dec 2023
For most of this discussion we were joined by a couple of others: T who stands as an atheist/agnostic humanist/secularist from what I gather, and D, a strong presuppositional Calvinist. Our brief, informal discussion over a delightful spiced-chai hookah mostly concerned problems of predestination and ethics. On the former, the familiar question arose of why God would create people only to predestine them for hell, and under what definition, if any, this could be construed as good and/or loving. As far as I could tell, no satisfactory answer was given from the presuppositionalist. The main strategy was to question the justification for the atheist’s definition of justice and/or love by which God is judged to be immoral. Although the atheist may not have a basis for morality that is acceptable to the presuppositionalist, this fact doesn’t seem to matter, since the atheist’s presuppositions for what provides an adequate basis for morality are different from those of the presuppositionalist, and does nothing to ease the atheist’s discomfort at the idea.
There was some discussion about the big bang theory, and whether or not it provides an adequate account of creation / the universe. I mostly tuned it out, because I think that whole line of questioning is fundamentally misguided and I find it tedious. I took this time to enjoy the pleasant buzz I was getting from the tobacco.
On the moral issue, S backed down from non-cognitivism, seeming more amenable to a hybrid non-cog theory or an anti-realist cognitivism. There was some discussion of what constitutes “nature” and what features of the natural world, if any, would justify a robust moral realism, but no conclusions. We came to the issue of subjectivism: how would one advocate for humanism against, for example, a Nazi ethic? The ensuing discussion took essentially the same form as before (concerning how to effectively convince an Islamic terrorist to abandon his program of systematically killing Jews): the Christian would point to historical facts and theological propositions, whereas the humanist would urge his moral intuitions on the listener. On the Christian side are questions of history and theology; on the humanist, the standard problems of relativism/subjectivism. Discussion was too brief and unsystematic to reach any conclusions here, either.
We wrapped up returning to the question of hell: how is eternal suffering justified as punishment for finite, individual offenses/sins? I sketched a preliminary answer: hell is not so much a 1-for-1 punishment, but more the logical conclusion of a life trajectory, if life has eternal significance/ramifications. The Bible paints a dark picture of humanity: through a primordial choice, we sadly inherit, by default, the negative trajectory. I don’t think that accepting this requires a radically new concept of justice necessarily, but maybe of humanity.
Overall, a very pleasant discussion, if ultimately fruitless.
For further discussion: let’s nail down the particulars of non-cognitivism, realism vs. anti-realism and figure out what seems most reasonable to S. Can any of these overcome the standard objections to relativism and/or vindicate a secular ethics? Again, I think we should revisit MacIntyre, who provides a great historical context for these issues and advocates something different entirely. Also: human “depravity,” which might make (double) predestination easier to swallow — scare quotes b/c that term has baggage — but let’s also discuss Christian universalism, which has been in circulation since at least Gregory of Nyssa, and would essentially dissolve the issue. David Bentley Hart has a recent book on the topic that might be worth checking out.
11 Dec 2023
The God Who Is There: We agree that although Schaeffer levels an effective critique of modern culture, he moves to an assertion of Christian truth without much, if any, argument connecting one to the other. It’s unclear who the audience for his book is supposed to be: the critiques appear directed at the atheist, but lack of connective argument suggests otherwise. S observes that apologetic arguments typically point toward God, but neglect issue of which God, and why—Schaeffer being no exception. Some of his arguments were from consequences: e.g., Christianity gets certain results, results which are good, therefore we should treat Christianity as true. Similar arguments from Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and a measure of endorsement from Jonathan Haidt. Is there any value to these arguments? Do the ends justify the means?—should we encourage religious belief for the benefits it confers, even if we believe it to be false (a “noble lie”)? Or should we accept the negative consequences of pure humanism? S wonders if there has ever been a pure humanist society, and what if any negative consequences there would be.
At any rate, S remains unconvinced, still holds to materialism as default. J objects that seeing materialism as the default position is essentially an article of faith. S cares about nonmaterial things, e.g., love. J questions basis for this care.
S answers that “care” is basic to human existence, prior to reasoning, and that this applies to all ethics, including religious, regardless of the appearance of rationality. Arguments from religion are no-true-Scotsman rationalizations of already-arrived-at conclusions. Historical validation is ad hoc, with the benefit of hindsight. J interprets this as emotivism: there is no rational basis for what to care about. Is it arbitrary, coming down to personal preference like ice cream flavors? (Does that comparison work?)
According to S, care for my self and/or neighbor naturally springs up, and this could be sufficient to argue against Islamic violence. Tactics would be demonstration of humanity, which includes relational capacity, rationality. J disagrees, citing Ali. J argues that this conception provides little to no adequate rational basis for convincing someone else, e.g. Islamic terrorist, to change their ways, and that Christianity provides a more rational/potent response.
J counters the charge of religious rationalization citing personal experience assenting to biblical injunctions despite the urgings of personal feelings. J asserts that Christianity, if true, provides a rational basis for moral reasoning. E.g., God exists, has certain attributes / issues certain injunctions, warranting certain beliefs/responses from humans, which sometimes goes against one’s personal feelings. As for the charge of no-true-Scotsman, J asserts the “true” church is validated by authentic exegesis, not hindsight or preconceived notions. Does this hold true historically, e.g, with slavery? J thinks so; S questions. Moreover, this ethic is valid only if Christian truth-claims are in fact true, and since S does not believe them to be, rejects the concept.
J counters the concept of “care”/emotion as basic with personal experience struggling with suicide—”caring” about own pain to a great degree—but choosing to live. The aim with this example is to falsify the idea that care about oneself is an adequate basis for ethics, since the desired result (choosing life) could only be achieved by going against what one ostensibly cares about. But is this actually the result of deeper “care”, i.e. about Christian truth? If so, this decision also ultimately reduces to a prerational leap of faith, which would appear to validate emotivism, at least as descriptive.
The discussion ends: S returns to his life as a hell-bound reprobate, while J returns home to further indoctrinate his children into a religious cult.
For future discussion/research: Revisit MacIntyre’s definition & critique of emotivism. Relationship between humanism and emotivism. Characterize “care” and how it bears on ethics, in particular emotivism. Does it boil down to arbitrary personal preference, basic & prior to rationality (leap of faith)? Might be worth revisiting Heidegger’s definition, though since Heidegger was essentially secularizing Kierkegaard, might be a foregone conclusion… in which case, MacIntyre’s observations on Kierk might be relevant. At the very least, we should revisit Heidegger’s critique of materialism, since apparently it’s still on the table. Also, Calvinism: what are S’s principle objections?
